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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

FRANK ROBERTSON,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

-vs-

)

COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,

Case No. 14538

:

De fendant/Appe1lant.

)

* * * * * * *

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
* * *

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed suit seeking to recover the sum of
Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) from Defendant
on grounds that the Defendant was negligent in transmitting said
funds by wire from Murray, Utah to Boise, Idaho.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A jury trial was held before the Honorable Jay E. Banks,
a Judge of the Third Judicial District, on February 24, 1976.
Judgment was entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant in the sum of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($16,500.00). The judgment was entered pursuant to Plaintiff's
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motion for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence,
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Commercial Security Bank seeks:

(1) reversal of the

judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiff and dismissal of
said cause of action or (2) requests the case be remanded to
the lower court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pharos Enterprises, a fertilizing company, was a debtor
of the Plaintiff, Frank Robertson, and Carl Harrison in the sum
of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00). (R6).
Pharos Enterprises maintained a business checking account at
the Murray Branch of Commercial Security Bank and on August 8,
1974 Pharos issued a check drawn on that account in the sum of
Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00), made payable
to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison", as joint payees.
The check was properly endorsed by both joint payees
and deposited by Robertson in the new Plymouth Branch of the
Bank of Idaho.

(R28).

It did not clear and was returned to

Robertson who contacted Harrison (an officer of Pharos) about
making it good.
It was endorsed again, (see Exhibit 3-D) upon the
representation that it would be paid, and sent direct to Commercial
Security Bank with directions, apparently from Harrison, to wire
-2-

the funds to Bank of Idaho at Boise.

Pharos made the check

good by bringing in a cashiers check.
The Murray Branch of Commercial Security Bank telephoned
its home office located in Ogden, Utah and requested the Ogden
office, which handled all wire transfers to send the sum of
Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) to "F.
Robertson and C. Harrison". Commercial's correspondent bank was
Continental Bank and Trust in Salt Lake City and Continental
Bank and Trust was a member of the Federal Reserve System while
Commercial Security Bank was not. Thus, the matter of transfer
of funds through Continental contemplated a clearing of these
funds through the Federal Reserve System to the Bank of Idaho at
Boise.

Commercial Security Bank forwarded a credit memo to

Continental Bank and Trust for transfer of such funds.

(Exhibit 2-D).

Continental Bank and Trust then prepared a debit memo (Exhibit 1-D)
which was forwarded to Commercial Security Bank and a remittance
advice through Federal Reserve requesting wire of the funds
to F. Robertson or C. Harrison at Bank of Idaho, Boise (Exhibit 4-D).
During transmission of the funds through Continental,
the word "and" was changed to "or", so the memo read "F. Robertson
or C. Harrison11 rather than "F. Robertson and C. Harrison".
Advice as to the funds being received was apparently given to
Mr. Harrison and he called for them.
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The sum of Sixteen Thousand

Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500„00) was paid directly to Carl
Harrison at the Bank of Idaho in Boise, Idaho. Carl Harrison
failed to pay any of the funds to the Plaintiff, Frank Robertson.
Frank Robertson subsequently filed suit in Third District
Court to recover the total sum of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($16,500.00).

Based upon the evidence, the trial judge

found in favor of the Plaintiff pursuant to a motion for directed
verdict.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT CARL HARRISON WAS
NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE SUIT.
As a general rule of law where two or more persons are
listed as joint payees on a negotiable instrument, their joinder
as parties in the suit is both proper and necessary.

10 C.J.S.

"Bills and Notes", Section 553 (c) states:
Where a bill, note or check is made payable to several
persons or is endorsed or signed by several, they are
joint holders and not only may, but must, sue jointly
as such. (Emphasis added). Id. 1179.
Also see Underwood v Otwell, 153 S.E. 2d 40 (1967).
In the case at bar, the negotiable instrument had been
made payable to the Plaintiff, Frank Robertson, and Carl Harrison,
as joint payees in the sum of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($16,500.00).

The Plaintiff, Frank Robertson, while
-4-

testifying at first that Carl Harrison had no interest in the
original check and he did not know why Carl Harrison's name was
on the check, nevertheless indicated later that the funds properly
should have been transmitted by wire subsequently in the names of
F. Robertson and C. Harrison in the same fashion as the original
check.

(R36-37).

Based on the testimony of Frank Robertson,

the trial court ruled that Carl Harrison had no beneficial
interest in the check.

(R23).

The Appellant, Commercial

Security Bank, contends that the trial court erred in holding
that Carl Harrison had no beneficial interest in the funds and
therefore Carl Harrison was not an indispensable party to the
suit.
Commercial Security Bank contends that where a negotiable
instrument is made payable to joint payees, both payees on the
negotiable instrument are indispensable parties to the cause of
action.

One (1) joint payee cannot establish ownership of the

proceeds without including the other payee in the law suit and
having that payee testify as to ownership.
The rule of law is that a negotiable instrument made
payable to joint payees can be discharged only by both parties.
Section 70 A-3-116 U.C.C. states:
An instrument payable to the order of two or more
persons: (b) if not in the alternative, is
payable to all of them and may be negotiated,
discharged or enforced only by all of them.
(Emphasis added).
-5-

The official comment to Section 3-116 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (Uniform Laws Annotated) Master Edition, Volume
II, states that both payees must be included in any action to
enforce the negotiable instrument.
PURPOSES OF CHANGE: The changes are intended to make
clear the distinction between an instrument payable
to fA or B1 and one payable to 'A and B 1 . The first
names either A or B as payee, so that either of them
who is in possession becomes a holder as that term is
defined in Section 1-201 and may negotiate, enforce
or discharge the instrument. The second is payable
only to A and B together, and as provided in the
original section both must endorse in order to
negotiate the instrument, although one may, of course,
be authorized to sign for the other. Likewise, both
must join in any action to enforce the instrument,
and the rights of one are not discharged without his
consent by the act of the other, (Emphasis added).
Id. 49.
Since Carl Harrison was not made either a party Plaintiff
or a party Defendant in this action and since the negotiable
instrument was made payable to both Frank Robertson and Carl
Harrison, the Appellant contends the trial court's ruling constitutes reversible error.
In the case of F. R. Orr Construction Company v Ready
Mixed Concrete Company, 472 P. 2d 193 (1970), the Colorado Court
of Appeals held that where a negotiable instrument was made
payable to joint payees it could not determine the actual interest
or ownership of the check without the presence of both payees.
In that case a check in the sum of Two Thousand Nine Hundred Four
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and .13/1.00 ($2,904.13) Dollars had been issued to Ready Mixed
Concrete Co. and Terry Construction Company, as joint payees.
Ready Mixed failed to obtain the endorsement of Terry and could
not cash the check.

Ready Mixed then sued Orr and Terry Construc-

tion Company to recover the full amount of the check.

Terry

Construction Company was never served with legal process as
the Plaintiff was unable to locate anyone from Terry Construction
Company.

The Defendant, Orr Construction Co., moved to dismiss

the complaint on the grounds that Terry Construction Company was
an indispensable party to the case and the court could not determine
ownership of the funds without including Terry Construction Company
in that suit.

The trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss

and further held that the Plaintiff was entitled to recover the
full amount of the check.

Defendant appealed.

The Colorado

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision and held in
favor of the Defendant.

The Court of Appeals said that if could

not determine the interest of Terry Construction Company without
its presence in the case.

The Plaintiff had asserted that under

the circumstances of the case it was the holder of the nonnegotiable chose in action and the trial court could properly
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determine that the non-endorsing co-payee had no interest in
the proceeds represented by the check. That was the same
argument which is raised in the case at bar by the Plaintiff.
Frank Robertson testified that Carl Harrison had no interest
in the proceeds of the check.

(R8). The trial court agreed

with the Plaintiff, and held that Carl Harrison had no interest
in the check and therefore was not an indispensable party.
The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected this same argument,
however, when it said:
Under the facts before us, the court could not
determine the interest of Terry without its
presence in the case. R.C.P. Colo. 19 (a);
Woodco v Lindanhal, 152 Colo. 49, 380 P. 2d
234; Wencr v Schleicrer, 130 Colo. 90, 273 P. 2d
356. The proper procedural steps to bring Terry
before the court for a determination of its
interest were not taken since it was not a party
Plaintiff and since it was not a "Defendant because
of a failure of service of process. There is no
evidence on which the trial court could find any
enforceable debt or contract flowing between
Plaintiff and Defendant for which the latter
could be held liable; and no other theory to
sustain the suit has been advanced. The trial
court, in effect, rewrote the check. The
judgment entered by the trial court is in error
and is reversed with direction to dismiss the
complaint. Id. 195.
The Appellant contends that F. R. Orr Construction
Company is directly on point.

In that case and in the case

at bar the Plaintiffs argued that the joint payee had no interest
in the proceeds represented in the check.
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In both cases the

trial court held that the joint payee in fact had no interest
in the check and therefore was not an indispensable party.
Appellant submits that under the facts of this case the trial
court could not determine the interests of Carl Harrison without
his presence in the case.
In Hinoiosa v Love, 496 S.W. 2d 224 (1973), the Texas
Court of Appeals held that in cases where a promissory note was
made payable to joint payees, then both parties were considered
to be indispensable in the suit.

In that case a promissory note

had been made payable to E. V. Love and the National Bank of
Commerce of Brownsville, as joint payees. The note had been
issued by Mr. L. L. Hinojosa. The note was subsequently not
honored and Mr. Love sued Mr. Hinojosa to recover full payment.
Mr. Hinojosa failed to respond to the complaint and the default
judgment was entered for Mr. Love. Mr. Hinojosa then moved for
a new trial which was later denied.

Mr. Hinojosa appealed the

decision and contended that since two (2) payees were listed on
the promissory note, both party payees were indispensable parties
to the suit. The Texas Court of Appeals held that the National
Bank of Commerce of Brownsville was indeed an indispensable party
and should be joined in the suit. Citing Section 3-116 U.C.C.
and Rule 39 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of
\ppeals concluded that "Proceedings in the absence of an
-9-

indispensable party was fundamental error".

The judgment of

the lower court was reversed and the case was remanded for
trial.
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure discusses
joinder of necessary parties.
(a) NECESSARY JOINDER. Subject to the provisions of
Rule 23 and of (b) of this rule, persons having a joint
interest shall be made parties and be joined on the
same side as Plaintiffs or Defendants. When a person
who should join as a Plaintiff refuses to do so, where
his consent cannot be obtained, he may be made a
Defendant, or in proper cases, involuntary Plaintiff.
(b) EFFECT THE FAILURE TO JOIN. When persons who are
not indispensable, but who ought to be pairties if
complete relief is to be accorded between those already
parties, have not been made parties and cire subject to
the jurisdiction of the court as to service of process,
the court shall order them summoned to appear in the
action. The court in its discretion may proceed in
the action without making such persons, parties, as
such jurisdiction over them can be acquired only by
their consent or voluntary appearance; but the judgment
rendered therein does not affect the rights or liabilities of absent persons.
(Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure concerns
class action suits).
Carl Harrison was not joined in the suit as a party
Plaintiff because Frank Robertson said he could not locate Mr.
Harrison (R43) and because he believed Mr. Harrison to be judgment
proof.

It would have been a relatively easy thing for Plaintiff

to have sued Mr. Harrison in Idaho and come armed to Utah with
a judgment against Carl Harrison which would have determined the
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ownership of the proceeds.
Based on the cases cited above, Appellant submits it
was reversible error for the trial court to rule that Carl
Harrison was not indispensable to the suit.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF.
A motion for directed verdict is governed under Rule
50 (a) U.R.C.P. and is usually granted only where the court is
convinced that reasonable minds could not differ as to the
evidence. When a motion for a directed verdict is made, the
trial court is required to view the evidence in light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. In
Anderson v Gribble, 30 U. 2d 68, P. 2d 432 (1973), the Utah
Supreme Court said:
The motion, although labeled a non-suit, was a
motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50 (a)
U.R.C.P. Upon a motion for a directed verdict,
the trial court is obligated to view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the party against
whom it is directed. This court will sustain
the granting of a motion only if the evidence
were such that reasonable men could not arrive
at a different conclusion.
(Also see Smith v Thornton, 23 U. 2d 110, 458 P. 2d 870 (1969);
Rhiness v Dansie, 24 U. 2d 375, 472 P. 2d 428 (1970).
Commercial Security Bank submits that if the evidence in
this case

were viewed in a light most favorable to the Bank, then
-11-

reasonable men could differ as to the conclusion reached and
therefore, the motion for a directed verdict was in error,
though we submit the indispensable party argument should have
disposed of the case.
An examination of the evidence clearly leaves a question
in one's mind.

Robertson testified that Harrison had no interest

in the proceeds and he had no idea why his (Harrison's) name
was on the check (R8, R30). He also testified that Harrison's
name should properly have been on the subsequent remittance
in whatever form that might have taken (R37).

Louis N.

Sylvester, Jr., an assistant treasurer and C.P.A. for Pharos
testified that John Smith, President of Pharos, told him to
make the check payable to both Robertson and Harrison (R50).
The reason given was that John Smith wanted Harrison to realize
the check was a final settlement.

(R51).

No further explanation

was given. The Plaintiff, Robertson, did not testify as to any
instructions he gave the bank as to how any remittance should
be made out or delivered.

He had no conversation with anyone

representing the defendant bank until some time after Harrison
had received the funds. John Mallacher, Vice President of the
bank, told of two phone calls. The first, advising that the first
Pharos check had not cleared, and the second, a request to wire
the funds but not in any particular manner (R53).
-12-

The calls, he

said, could have been from either party.
When the first check bounced, it was returned to
Robertson who turned it over to Harrison for further handling
after each endorsed it again. Robertson had nothing further
to do with the matter relying on Harrison to bring him the
funds.
The record indicates that Pharos Enterprises was
a debtor of both Frank Robertson and Carl Harrison (R6).
If the money had been paid to Frank Robertson only, who is to
say that the bank might not now be facing a suit at the hands
of Mr. Harrison. This was the dilemma confronting the bank
when the matter of ownership was in question, and all parties
not before the court.
It is Appellant's contention that since it was never
clear why both names were listed on the check, the jury should
have been given the opportunity to determine if the Plaintiff
was entitled to keep all of the proceeds or only a portion
thereof.

Since several explanations were offered and since

the evidence should be viewed in a light most favorable to
the Bank, Appellant contends that reasonable minds could differ
and therefore, the directed verdict should not have been granted.
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POINT III
A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT MADE PAYABLE TO JOINT PAYEES IS
ENFORCEABLE ONCE THE INSTRUMENT IS PROPERLY ENDORSED BY
BOTH PAYEES. DELIVERY TO ONE IS DELIVERY TO BOTH.
The general rule of law is that a negotiable instrument
made payable to joint payees can be discharged only by both
parties.

Section 70 A-3-116 U.C.C. states:
An instrument payable to the order of two or more
persons: (b) if not in the alternative is payable
to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged
or enforced only by all of them.
Since the negotiable instrument in this case was made

payable to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison", it could only be
negotiated, discharged and enforced by both payees.

Section

70 A-3-202 U.C.C. defines "negotiation" as:
Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such
form that the transferee becomes a holder. If the
instrument is payable to order, it is negotiated by
delivery with any necessary endorsements; if payable
to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery.
(3) An endorsement is effective for negotiation only
when it conveys the entire instrument or any unpaid
residue. If it purports to be of less, it operates
only as a partial assignment.
The rule of law set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code
states that an instrument made payable to joint payees must
be negotiated by both payees. This act of negotiation is
accomplished when the instrument is properly endorsed by both
payees.

The Utah case law supports the proposition that a
-14-

negotiable instrument made payable to joint payees must be
endorsed by both payees. In Pacific Metals Company v Tracy-Collins
Bank and Trust Company, 21 U. 2d 400, 446 P. 2d 303 (1968), the
Supreme Court held that the Defendant bank was liable for
honoring a check which was made payable to joint payees but
which was endorsed only by one payee.

In that case, the check

was made payable to the Plaintiff and to Olympus Heating as
joint payees. The Defendant bank honored the check upon the
endorsement of Olympus Heating only, without the endorsement of
Plaintiff.

Plaintiff brought suit against the Defendant bank

and alleged the check should not have been paid to Olympus
Heating because it did not contain the endorsement of both
payees. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor
of the Plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Utah, in affirming
that judgment, said:
The nature of a check is an order by its maker to
its bank or depository that the face amount be
paid to the payee he designates, and it is noticed
to anyone accepting the check that the signature
of all payees are required. This requirement is
just as binding on the drawee bank as upon anyone
else. For examples of cases which well illustrate
this principle are Crahe v Mercantile Trust and
Savings Loan, 129 N.E. 120 and Midland Savings and
Loan Company v Tradesmen National Bank of Oklahoma
City, 5 7 F. 2d 686 (C.C.A. Tenth).
Consistent with that reasoning and in harmony with
our view of the law, the Defendant, Bank of Salt
Lake, having failed to obtain the endorsement of
both payees, is likewise liable to Pacific Metals on
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the check but the Plaintiff, of course, is limited
to one recovery of its money. (Emphasis added).
Id. 503.
In the instant case, there is no question but that the
negotiable instrument was properly endorsed by both joint payees.
The Plaintiff contended that the funds were paid to one payee,
Carl Harrison, and that such funds should have been paid directly
to both payees.
The Appellant respectfully submits that the law only
requires the endorsement of both payees, and not that the
negotiable instrument be paid directly to both payees. This
contention is supported in the case of Continental Bank and Trust
Company v People's National Bank and Trust Company, 217 Pa. Super.
371, 274 A. 549 (1970).

In that case the bank had paid a negotiable

instrument to one of two joint payees without obtaining the
endorsement of the other payee. However, in the dictum of the
opinion the court concluded that if the negotiable instrument
had been properly endorsed by both joint payees, the sum could
be paid to either payee. The court said:
Section 4-401 (1) of the code provides that a bank
may charge against its customer's account only items
that are 'properly payable1. Without the supplier's
endorsement the item was not 'properly payable'.
Cf. Pacific Metals Company v Tracy-Collins Bank and
Trust Company, 21 U. 2d 400, 446 P. 2d 203 (1968).
Thus Continental had no right to charge its customer's
account and was liable to its customers for the amount
of the item. Continental Bank and Trust Company v
Philadelphia National Bank, 92 Monpg. Cty. L. Rep. 35,
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38 (1969). See Pacific Metals Company v Tracy-Collins
Bank and Trust Company, Supra. However, if both
endorsements had been obtained, the item would have
been 'properly payable1 when it was presented to
Continental. In that case Continental could have
charged its customer's account without incurring
liability. People's failure to require the additional
endorsement thus resulted in Continental's liability
to its depository. (Emphasis added). Id. 550.
In the case at bar the check issued by Pharos Enterprises
was payable to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison" as joint payees.
The check was properly endorsed by both payees but was subsequently returned for insufficient funds.

Pharos Enterprises

then deposited a cashiers check with Commercial Security Bank
in order to make the original check good.

During transmission

of the funds by wire, an error apparently was made in changing
the word "and" to "or".

Frank Robertson contended that because

of the error in wiring funds from Appellant's bank to the Bank of
Idaho , the funds were erroneously paid to Carl Harrison.

Appellant

submits that the error made in this case in changing the word "and"
to "or" had no material affect upon the transaction because the
negotiable instrument was properly endorsed by both joint payees.
Since the original check was properly endorsed, the proceeds could
be paid to either of the joint payees.

The fact that the check

was returned for insufficient funds did not void or cancel the
check.

A new check was not issued to replace the original check.

-17-

The cashiers check which was deposited by Pharos Enterprises at
Appellant's bank was designed to cover and insure that the original
check would be paid in full.

Assuming arguendo that the error had

not occurred, the negotiable instrument would have been paid either
to Carl Harrison or Frank Robertson, because the negotiable instrumen
was properly endorsed by both parties.

The error did not affect the

payment of the negotiable instrument.

The negotiable instrument wou]

have been paid to either party upon proper endorsement, regardless
of the error.
We further point out that delivery of a check to one of
two payees is tantamount to delivery to both.
Management Corporation,

(Illinois) 301

See Gillespie v Riley

N.E. 2d 506 (1973).

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit the judgment entered in favor of
Plaintiff and against Defendant should be reversed and/or a new
trial granted.
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD L. STINE of and for
Olmstead, Stine and Campbell
Attorney for Appellant
Commercial Security Bank
2650 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah
84401
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